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The present set of experiments aimed to investigate the effects of negative emotion on specific aspects
of eyewitness recall and recognition performance. The experience of emotion was manipulated between
subjects, with participants either viewing a crime scenario (a mugging) or a neutral scenario (a
conversation). Eyewitness recall was categorized into descriptions of the perpetrator, critical incident,
victim, and environmental details. The completeness and accuracy of eyewitness recall across categories
of detail were measured in Experiment 1. A significant main effect of negative emotion was found for
the completeness of recall. Furthermore, a significant main effect of the completeness of eyewitness
statements was found, but not for their accuracy. However, these main effects were qualified by a
significant interaction between emotion and category of detail recalled. Specifically, emotional partici-
pants provided a more complete description of the perpetrator than neutral participants; however, they
were less able than their neutral counterparts to describe what the perpetrator did to the victim. In light
of these findings, Experiment 2 investigated whether enhanced completeness of perpetrator descriptions
during recall translated into an enhanced ability to recognize the perpetrator from a photographic lineup
by emotional compared with neutral participants. Results from Experiment 2 suggest that while emo-
tional participants again provide a more complete description of the perpetrator, they are less able than
their neutral counterparts to recognize the perpetrator from a photographic lineup. Results are discussed
in terms of a retrieval motivation hypothesis of negative emotional experience and the possible
consequences for eyewitness testimony.
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The experience of emotion by an eyewitness to a crime is one of
the main variables that can affect the reliability of eyewitness
testimony (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). For this reason, much
previous research has investigated the effects of emotion on mem-
ory recall (e.g., Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Edelstein, Alexander,
Goodman, & Newton, 2004). The central argument that has de-
veloped from this research is that individuals who witness a
negative emotional event may have enhanced memory for the gist
or central details of the event but impaired memory for peripheral
details (e.g., Reisberg & Heuer, 2004, 2007; Safer, Christianson,
Autry, & Österlund, 1998; Wessel, van der Kooy, & Merckelbach,
2000, Experiment 2; see also Edelstein et al., 2004).
However, this research is limited by a potentially confounding
factor: There are two working definitions of what central and
peripheral details are. For example, Christianson and Loftus
(1991) defined central details as details that were spatially central
or in the foreground of the scene. Thus, peripheral details were
background details (Christianson & Loftus, 1991). On the other
hand, Heuer and Reisberg (1990) defined central and peripheral
details in terms of centrality to the plot of the scenes shown to
participants. It is therefore no surprise to learn that Christianson
and Loftus (1991) and Heuer and Reisberg (1990) reported con-
flicting results. Christianson and Loftus (1991) reported enhanced
memory for central details and impaired memory for peripheral
details when participants experienced negative emotion, whereas
Heuer and Reisberg (1990) did not. It is largely argued that these
seemingly conflicting results are due to the different definitions of
central and peripheral details used (for a full review, see Reisberg
& Heuer, 2004).
In spite of the expansive extant literature on emotion and mem-
ory, little is known about the effects of emotion on eyewitness
memory—in particular, the way that the experience of emotion
affects memory for the perpetrator of a crime. For instance, ques-
tions remain as to how the experience of emotion may affect the
recall of action details (what the perpetrator did) compared with
descriptive details of the perpetrator? In an eyewitness scenario,
the ability to describe what the perpetrator did may be equally
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important as the ability to describe the perpetrator, and, conse-
quently, this question holds both theoretical and practical import.
It is therefore more than a little surprising that only a few studies
have differentiated recall for separate aspects of an event in this
way (Stein & Memon, 2006; Wright & Holliday, 2007). Those
experiments that have analyzed recall in this way suggest that
descriptions of actions may be recalled to different levels of
completeness and accuracy than person descriptions (Stein &
Memon, 2006; Wright & Holliday, 2007). However, the topic of
these articles was interviewing technique and not emotional expe-
rience, and therefore this remains a largely unexplored area for
emotion and memory researchers.
It is well established by the eyewitness literature that describing
a person, such as the perpetrator of a crime, is a very difficult task
(for a recent review, see Meissner, Sporer, & Schooler, 2007).
Meissner et al. (2007) argued that the difficulty of describing a
person often results in nondistinct, general descriptions, meaning
that they can apply to many people in the given population.
However, given established links between emotion and memory
for central details (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004, 2007), it seems
plausible that the experience of negative emotion may enhance
memory for information about a perpetrator, due to this being such
a central element of the crime witnessed (therefore conforming to
both spatial and plot definitions of central details). And what effect
might that have on the recall of other aspects of the emotional
to-be-remembered event? Could the experience of negative
emotion result in the focusing of attentional resources onto
the perpetrator of the crime, resulting in better descriptions of the
perpetrator but poorer descriptions of his actions? Or could such
attentional focus result in improved descriptions of both the per-
petrator and the action details of the crime? In an attempt to answer
these questions, the first experiment described in this article in-
vestigates whether the experience of negative emotion affects the
recall of aspects of a crime event differently.
Eyewitnesses may also be asked to visually identify the perpe-
trator of the crime from an identity parade or lineup containing the
suspect. Therefore, the possible effects of negative emotion on
eyewitness recognition performance are of equal interest to those
on recall performance, and this is addressed in Experiment 2.
Research suggests that the effects of stress may greatly impair an
eyewitness’s ability to recognize the perpetrator of a crime, even if
the perpetrator has been encountered for a considerable period of
time (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004, 2007).
Morgan et al. (2004, 2007) conducted a series of experiments
investigating the effects of stress on person recognition. The par-
ticipant pool consisted of male soldiers who were interrogated in a
well-lit room for 30 min at a time over approximately four hours
as part of their interrogation resistance training. Morgan et al.
(2004) investigated two scenarios: a high-stress and a low-stress
interrogation. The high-stress interrogation involved physical con-
frontation by the interrogator toward the soldier and the low-stress
condition did not. Morgan et al. (2004) found that soldiers who had
taken part in high-stress interrogations were significantly worse at
subsequently identifying any of their interrogators than those who
had taken part in the low-stress interrogations. They thereafter
argued that eyewitnesses who encounter heightened stress and
personal threat while attempting to encode details of the event
and/or perpetrator are likely to be highly error prone when asked
to subsequently identify the perpetrator. In further support for the
theory of stress impairing perpetrator recognition, a meta-analysis
of the effects of stress on eyewitness memory also found impair-
ment in recognition performance for participants who experienced
stress compared with those who did not (Deffenbacher, Bornstein,
Penrod, & McGorty, 2004).
Although able to inform the debate over the potential effects of
negative emotion on eyewitness recognition performance, the
stress that soldiers experience from repeated interrogations is
likely to be very different from the types of negative emotions
experienced in a more common eyewitness scenario. For instance,
the extant literature on the central and peripheral effect suggests
that an eyewitness may focus attention on the perpetrator, which
could lead to an improved ability to recognize the perpetrator of a
crime, if that crime caused the eyewitness to experience negative
emotion. Therefore, the second experiment attempts to bridge this
gap with an investigation of the effects of negative emotion on
recognition memory performance. Thus, to summarize, Experi-
ment 1 investigates the possible effects of negative emotion on
recall memory performance. Participant recall is coded for descrip-
tive details and action details of the perpetrator separately in order
to answer the question of whether the experience of negative
emotion may differently affect the descriptions of these two key
elements of an eyewitness statement. Experiment 2 addresses
whether negative emotion affects the ability of participants to
recognize the perpetrator from a photographic lineup, as the stress
literature would indicate, or whether it may improve recognition
ability due to the perpetrator being a central detail, as the emotion
literature may indicate.
In order to achieve this, the two experiments follow a similar
methodology: one group of participants is presented with a video
depicting a crime event that elicits negative emotion, and a second
group is presented with an event that is very similar in most details
but remains neutral. The paradigm of presenting participants with
either an emotional or a highly similar and comparable neutral
event has long been the preferred methodology of emotion and
memory researchers (e.g., Christianson & Loftus, 1987; Clifford &
Scott, 1978; Hulse, Allan, Memon, & Read, 2007; Safer et al.,
1998). In order to ensure comparability between the emotion-
inducing and neutral video scenarios, both videos are controlled to
ensure that the actions depicted are as similar as possible, even
during the critical sequence that either depicts a mugging
(emotion-inducing) or an altruistic act and a conversation (neutral).
Finally, recent reviews of the emotion and memory literature
(e.g., Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Levine & Pizarro, 2004) have
called for a greater delineation and specification of our concept of
“emotion.” Researchers have argued that negative emotion is not a
single construct, but rather that we may experience more than one
emotion at a time and that the eyewitness literature, in particular,
would benefit from delineating the experience of emotion in this
way (Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Levine & Pizarro, 2004). There-
fore, in this study, we investigate the types of negative emotions
experienced by eyewitnesses to a crime via participant ratings of
their experience of 13 separate emotions.
Experiment 1
As it is important for an eyewitness to provide a complete and
accurate description of what they encountered, both of these con-
structs of memory are assessed. In line with the current literature
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(e.g., Reisberg & Heuer, 2007), it is predicted that participants in
the negative emotion condition will provide a more complete and
accurate description of the perpetrator of the crime event than
participants who experience the neutral condition, as the perpetra-
tor is central both to the plot and spatially in the videos (therefore
conforming to both definitions of central details). Participant recall
is also be analyzed in terms of recall for the environmental details,
description of the victim, and the actions the perpetrator commits.
For these other detail categories, competing hypotheses can be
entertained. If the perpetrator is a central detail under emotional
conditions, then his actions may also be central to attention,
therefore resulting in enhanced recall of the action details of the
critical incident for emotional compared with neutral participants.
On the other hand, if the attentional focus is on the descriptive
details of the perpetrator only, it may be that his actions are not
encoded in depth by negatively emotional participants. The same
predictions could be made for recall of the victim—as she shares
close spatial proximity to the perpetrator during the videos, de-
scriptions of her may benefit, or be at a disadvantage, because of
the experience of negative emotion. Finally, it is unclear whether
environmental details would be classified as central or peripheral—as
they are spatially central throughout the video, however, one
would not classify them as central to the plot of the scenario. In
sum, it is predicted that the experience of negative emotion will
enhance the completeness and accuracy of perpetrator descriptions
for negatively emotional participants in comparison with neutral
participants, whereas competing hypotheses are entertained for the
recall of other aspects of the crime event, as outlined previously.
Method
Participants and design. Psychology students were recruited
from the University of Aberdeen in the United Kingdom and
awarded course credit for participation. In total, 101 participants
took part, of whom 51 viewed the emotion-inducing video and 50
viewed the neutral video. There were 30 males and 71 females,
ages 17 to 46 years (M  19.5, SD  3.1). All spoke English as
their first language. A 2  4 mixed design was employed, with the
between-subjects factor of the emotion-inducing or neutral video
and the within-subjects factor of category of detail (environmental,
critical incident, victim, and perpetrator). The dependent variables
were the completeness and accuracy of recall.
Materials and apparatus: Videos. The scenarios utilized in
this experiment were staged events involving the same actors. In
both videos, the participants view an older woman withdrawing
money from a cash machine and then walking down a road and
entering a wooded area. A young man is also shown to be entering
the wooded area. What follows next is the critical incident, which
differs slightly between scenarios. In the mugging scenario, the
man approaches the woman and shouts at her, grabs hold of her
handbag, and attempts to remove it from her shoulder. The woman
shouts at the man, but he successfully removes the woman’s
handbag and runs off. The woman then calls a friend on her mobile
phone to say that she has been mugged. In the conversation
scenario, the man approaches the woman and asks her for the time.
When checking her watch, the woman’s handbag falls off her arm
and onto the ground. The young man picks up the woman’s
handbag and holds it while she tells him the time, after which he
gives the bag back to the woman and runs off to catch his bus. The
older woman then calls a friend to arrange to meet for tea. The
mugging and conversation critical incidents were stringently con-
trolled so that in both scenarios the young man and the older
woman exchanged words, the man handled the woman’s handbag
and ran away at the end of the interaction, after which the woman
makes a phone call. For ease of exposition, regardless of whether
referring to the mugging or conversational scenario, the man is
labeled as the “perpetrator” and the woman as the “victim.”
Pilot testing utilizing the postevent emotion rating scale (see
description for full details, scale ranging numerically from 0 to 3)
revealed a mean negative emotion rating for the mugging scenario
of M  1.03, SD  0.64, and a negative emotion rating of M 
0.20, SD  0.08 for the conversation scenario. As this difference
is statistically significant, t(8)  2.54, p  .035, d  1.82, 95% CI
[0.07, 1.59], the film clips were deemed suitable for use in the
present study, and hereafter, the mugging scenario is referred to as
the “emotion-inducing scenario” and the conversation scenario as
the “neutral scenario.”
Postevent emotional rating scale. This scale required partic-
ipants to rate their level of experience of irritation, annoyance,
outrage, anger, happiness, sadness, sympathy, disgust, upset,
fright, anxiety, relief, and also an option of “I feel nothing.” The
level of each option was measured on a 4-point scale ranging from
not at all to very much so (scored on a scale from 0 to 3). Ratings
of happiness, relief, and feeling nothing are reported separately
from ratings of negative emotions.
Filler tasks. In order to introduce a delay between viewing the
video and completion of the recall measures (20 min), participants
completed questionnaires on likes and dislikes. As these measures
were filler items, they are not discussed further.
Recall. Participants were given a recall sheet with the follow-
ing instructions: “Please write down all the details that you re-
member from the video you have just watched.” Participants were
told that they could continue on the other side of the sheet, if
necessary. Participants were also given a cued-recall test; however,
those results are not reported herein.
Procedure. All participants were tested individually and in-
formed that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate how
general visual ability can affect memory. After completion of the
consent form, participants viewed one of the two video scenarios.
After viewing the video, participants were given a booklet con-
taining the postevent emotion rating scale and a range of other
questionnaires and tasks. Completion of these measures resulted in
a lag of approximately 20 min between viewing the video and
completing the recall measures. The recall task was then given,
after which all participants were debriefed and told the true nature
of the experiment.
Data coding and analysis for the recall tasks. Prior to the
commencement of testing, detailed transcripts of the videos were
generated by two independent coders who were unaware of the
experimental manipulation. From these descriptions key, poten-
tially forensically relevant information across the four categories
of details (environmental, critical incident, perpetrator and victim)
was selected (see Table 1 for the total number of details in each
category for each video). Following testing, participant recall was
coded in terms of completeness, which reflected the total number
of correct details participants recalled, and accuracy (the propor-
tion of a participants’ total recall that was accurate). Given that the
number of recallable correct details differed slightly across emo-
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tional and neutral scenarios (see Table 1), the data were trans-
formed into proportions to enable comparisons across scenarios.
The proportion completeness of recall was calculated by dividing
the number of correct details a participant recalled by the possible
number of correct details they could have recalled, based upon the
totals in Table 1. Proportion accuracy was calculated by dividing
the number correct details a participant recall by the total number
of details they recalled. A measure of intercoder agreement was
calculated between the experimenter (K.A.H.) and an additional
coder who had not created the video transcripts and was there-
fore blind to the experimental procedure and had not viewed
either video previously. The blind coder was provided with a
copy of the video transcripts to facilitate coding of accuracy.
Agreement was based on a random sample (20%) of participant
booklets. Intercoder agreement across all categories of detail in
the recall was high (all rs  .8), with all disagreements resolved
through discussion.
The completeness and accuracy of recall were coded and ana-
lyzed separately with analysis of variance (ANOVA). Follow-up t
tests with Bonferroni correction were also conducted to further
investigate the effects of negative emotion on memory recall. As a
Bonferroni correction is a highly conservative correction,
follow-up comparisons were divided into two families to correct
for the possibility of Type II errors (see Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007). As clear directional predictions exist about perpetrator
recall, one planned comparison of the completeness and accuracy
of the perpetrator descriptions was run, thus, /1  .05. One
further family of unplanned comparisons of the completeness and
accuracy of environmental, critical incident, and victim descrip-
tions was also conducted, thus, /3  .016.
Results
Manipulation check. An independent samples t test on the
ratings from the postevent emotion rating scale supported the
result from the pilot data: Participants who viewed the emotion-
inducing video rated their experience of negative emotions as
significantly higher (M  1.08, SD  0.65) than participants who
viewed the neutral video (M  0.13, SD  0.18), t(99)  10.05,
p  .001, d  1.99, 95% CI [0.76, 1.14]. Furthermore, to ensure
that neutral participants did not experience any emotions (as pos-
itive emotions were also included in the postevent emotion rating
scale), these scores were also considered. All participants who
viewed the neutral video rated below 1 for all possible emotion
ratings (M  0.36, SD  0.15), thus suggesting that they did not
have any emotional experience throughout the video.
These data confirm that (a) the emotion manipulation was
successful in inducing negative emotion in those who viewed the
emotion-inducing video, and (b) participants who viewed the neu-
tral video remained neutral. Therefore, participants who viewed
the emotion-inducing video will hereafter be referred to as emo-
tional participants and those who viewed the neutral video will be
referred to as neutral participants.
Breakdown of emotion ratings for those viewing the
crime. The experience of emotion was further analyzed in terms
of the individual emotions experienced by participants. The high-
est emotion rating by participants who viewed the emotion-
inducing video was for sympathy (M  2.25, SD  0.76), fol-
lowed by disgust (M  1.41, SD  1.08), annoyance (M  1.25,
SD  1.02), irritation (M  1.24, SD  0.99), anger (M  1.20,
SD  1.02), and sadness (M  1.18, SD  0.93). The remaining
emotions of upset (M  0.90, SD  0.83), outrage (M  0.90, SD –
0.94), experiencing nothing (M  0.67, SD  0.95), anxiety
(M  0.25, SD  0.56), fright (M  0.22, SD  0.50), happiness
(M  0.18, SD  0.43), and relief (M  0.08, SD  0.38) were
all scored below 1 one the scale.
Analysis of the recall tasks. Completeness and accuracy
mean proportions, standard deviations, and confidence intervals
for emotional and neutral participants across all categories of
details can be found in Table 2.
Completeness of recall. A 2 (emotional vs. neutral)  4
(environmental, critical incident, victim, perpetrator) mixed design
ANOVA was run on the completeness data from the recall task. A
main effect of emotion was found, with neutral participants pro-
ducing more complete recall, F(1, 98)  13.31, p  .001, partial
2  .12. A main effect of category of detail recalled was also
found, F(3, 294)  154.91, p  .001, partial 2  .61, with
descriptions of environmental details more complete than of the
victim (p  .001) or perpetrator (p  .001). Descriptions of the
critical incident were also more complete than of the victim (p 
.001) and the perpetrator (p .001), and descriptions of the victim
were more complete than of the perpetrator (p  .001). The
completeness of the environmental and critical incident descrip-
tions did not differ significantly from each other (p  1.00).
Critically, a significant interaction between the experience of emo-
tion and category of detail was observed, F(3, 294)  71.77, p 
.001, partial 2  .42.
Planned comparisons revealed that emotional participants pro-
vided a more complete description of the perpetrator than neutral
participants, t(99)  2.25, p  .014 (one-tailed), d  0.36. Post
hoc testing, on the other hand, revealed that neutral participants
provided a more complete description of the critical incident than
the emotional participants, t(99)  11.18, p  .001, d  2.25.
Further, there were no significant differences between emotional
and neutral participants in the completeness of the victim, t(99) 
1.53, p  .129, d  0.31, or environmental descriptions, t(98) 
0.15, p  .884, d  0.00. Interestingly, within the emotional
group, the degree of emotion experienced did not correlate with the
degree of perpetrator or critical incident recall in any linear way
(critical incident: r .15, p .249; perpetrator: r .10, p .433,
respectively).
Accuracy of recall. A further 2 (emotional vs. neutral)  4
(environmental, critical incident, victim, perpetrator) mixed design
ANOVA was run on the proportion accuracy of recall. The main
effect of emotion was nonsignificant (F  1). A main effect of
category of detail was found, F(3, 294)  7.74, p  .001, partial
2  .07, with the critical incident the most accurately recalled
Table 1
Total Number of Forensically Relevant Details for Each Detail
Category in the Emotion-Inducing and Neutral Videos
Detail category Emotional Neutral
Environmental 160 171
Critical incident 81 67
Victim 45 45
Perpetrator 42 42
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detail category (all ps  .005); the three other categories did not
differ significantly from each other (all ps .066). The interaction
between emotion and category of detail was nonsignificant, F(3,
294)  1.47, p  .223, partial 2  .01.
Planned comparisons revealed that emotional and neutral par-
ticipants’ descriptions of the perpetrator were equally accurate,
t(99)  0.97, p  .334, d  0.16. Post hoc t tests revealed that
emotional participants’ environmental descriptions were more ac-
curate than neutral participants’, t(98)  2.96, p  .004, d  0.59.
However, emotional and neutral participants descriptions of the
victim, t(99)  0.44, p  .657, d  0.08, and critical incident,
t(99)  1.17, p  .245, d  0.02, were equally accurate. Finally,
within the emotional group, the degree of emotion experienced did
not correlate with the accuracy of environmental detail recall in a
linear way, r  .12, p  .410.
Discussion
The current experiment aimed to investigate the effects of
negative emotion on eyewitness recall memory for the perpetrator
of a crime in comparison with other aspects of the event. It was
predicted that participants who viewed the emotionally arousing
video would focus their attention on to the perpetrator of the crime,
given he was both spatially central and central to the plot of the
emotional video. It was further argued that such attentional focus
would be likely to result in a more complete and accurate descrip-
tion of the perpetrator by emotional compared with neutral partic-
ipants. In line with predictions, emotional participants provided a
more complete description of the perpetrator than neutral partici-
pants. This suggests that the perpetrator was central to attention for
emotional participants but not for their neutral counterparts. How-
ever, the experience of emotion had no effect on the accuracy of
perpetrator descriptions. This may be because both emotional and
neutral participants were monitoring their memory and only re-
porting those details about which they were very confident in their
accuracy (e.g., Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Indeed, accuracy levels
were generally quite high.
Neutral participants provided a more complete description of the
action details of the critical incident than emotional participants
did, although, again, with no significant differences in the accuracy
of recall. No significant differences were found in the complete-
ness or accuracy of victim recall by emotional and neutral partic-
ipants. Emotional participants did provide a more accurate descrip-
tion of the environmental details than their neutral counterparts;
however, both emotion conditions resulted in similar levels of
completeness of recall about environmental information. These
results add to the literature on links between emotion and recall of
central and peripheral details (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). In par-
ticular, they indicate that negative emotions experienced when
witnessing a crime improved memory for one aspect of the central
details about the crime (description of the perpetrator) while im-
pairing memory for another aspect (what the perpetrator did) in
comparison with neutral participant recall. The current data sug-
gest that it may only be the descriptive details of the perpetrator
that are central to attention for emotional participants, and this may
inhibit their ability to describe the perpetrator’s actions.
The final task of Experiment 1 was to analyze the emotional
experience of participants who viewed the emotion-inducing
video. Emotional participants appeared to experience sympathy-
and anger-related emotions (see Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988,
for a conceptualization of the categories of emotional groups).
These findings suggest that an eyewitness to a mugging crime may
experience a range of emotions during the event rather than one
emotion in isolation (e.g., Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Levine &
Pizarro, 2004).
The current experiment indicates that it is the descriptive details
of the perpetrator of a crime that emotional participants appear to
centralize when viewing the crime event. Therefore, could this
improve the ability of emotional participants to accurately recog-
nize the perpetrator from a photographic lineup—a task that is
known to be very difficult? This question is the focus of Experi-
ment 2.
Experiment 2
Findings from Experiment 1 indicate that emotional participants
are able to describe the perpetrator of a mugging crime more fully,
but not more accurately, than neutral participants. The central and
peripheral effect literature argues that this is likely due to a
narrowing of attention on the perpetrator, given he is central to
both the plot and spatially (e.g., Reisberg & Heuer, 2004, 2007).
This finding raises a very interesting question: Could the experi-
ence of emotion during encoding offset the difficulty of recogniz-
ing a perpetrator in a photographic lineup? The current literature
on stress and recognition memory suggests that stress impairs the
ability of an eyewitness to successfully recognize the perpetrator
from a photographic lineup (e.g., Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Mor-
gan et al., 2004, 2007). However, it is not clear how these results
Table 2
Mean Proportion Recall of Emotional and Neutral Participants in Terms of Completeness and Accuracy Across All Detail Categories
Detail category
Completeness Accuracy
Emotional Neutral Emotional Neutral
M, SD 95% CI M, SD 95% CI M, SD 95% CI M, SD 95% CI
Environmental 0.35, 0.19 [0.30, 0.39] 0.35, 0.12 [0.31, 0.40] 0.97, 0.04 [0.96, 0.99] 0.94, 0.06 [0.96, 0.96]
Critical incident 0.18, 0.10 [0.14, 0.22] 0.49, 0.18 [0.46, 0.54] 0.98, 0.05 [0.97, 0.99] 0.99, 0.02 [0.98, 1.00]
Victim 0.18, 0.10 [0.15, 0.21] 0.15, 0.08 [0.12, 0.17] 0.92, 0.11 [0.89, 0.96] 0.94, 0.12 [0.90, 0.97]
Perpetrator 0.11, 0.10 [0.09, 0.14] 0.08, 0.06 [0.05, 0.10] 0.87, 0.28 [0.80, 0.94] 0.92, 0.21 [0.85, 0.99]
Note. Scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 denoting no recall and 1 denoting 100% recall. Asterisks denote significant differences between emotional and
neutral participants.
 p  .05.  p  .001.
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might extend to other types of eyewitness situations in which a
different range and intensity of emotions might be experienced.
Therefore, the aim of Experiment 2 is to investigate the possi-
bility that the experience of negative emotion by participants may
enhance their ability to recognize the perpetrator from a photo-
graphic lineup. Two forms of photographic lineup are shown to
participants—one is a “target present” (TP) lineup, and is so-called
because it contains a photograph of the perpetrator of the crime
(the target). The second version is called a “target absent” (TA)
lineup, which does not contain an image of the perpetrator and
instead, in his place, contains an image of a person who looks
highly similar to the perpetrator. The construction of the lineups is
fully described in the Method section.
Finally, as in Experiment 1, recall data were collected from
participants—this is to ensure that we replicate the finding of
enhanced descriptive recall of the perpetrator, upon which our
recognition-based questions are predicated. The emotional expe-
rience of participants was also measured in the same way as in
Experiment 1, in order to ensure consistency of the emotional
experience between experiments.
Method
Participants and design. In total, 233 psychology students
were recruited from the University of Aberdeen in the United
Kingdom and were awarded course credit for participation; 61
were male, 172 were female, and all were between 17 and 53 years
old (M  20.07, SD  4.84).
Recognition. A 2  2 between-subjects design was employed
with factors of emotion (emotion-inducing or neutral video) and
lineup type (TP or TA). Of the 233 participants who took part, 118
participants viewed the emotion-inducing video and 115 viewed
the neutral video. One hundred sixteen participants viewed TP
lineups and 117 viewed TA lineups.
Recall. Of the 233 participants who were tested, the first 116
participants’ (roughly half) recall for details of the video were
analyzed, as a G*Power analysis indicated this was a sufficient
number to detect significant effects. Of those 116, 34 were male
and 82 were female, with an age range of 17 to 53 years (M 
20.43, SD 5.52). Further, 59 viewed the emotion-inducing video
and 57 viewed the neutral video. A 2  4 mixed design was used
with the between-subjects factor of emotion (emotion-inducing or
neutral video) and the within-subjects factor of category of detail
(environmental, critical incident, victim, perpetrator).
Materials and apparatus. All materials and apparatus are the
same as in Experiment 1, except for the photographic lineups,
which are described next.
Photographic lineups. The present experiment utilized si-
multaneous TP and TA lineups for the perpetrator depicted in the
videos. A correct response to a TP lineup is recorded when an
eyewitness correctly identifies the perpetrator (a hit), whereas the
choice of a foil is incorrect (a false-positive), as is the response that
the perpetrator is not present (a miss). In TA lineups, an accurate
response is recorded when an eyewitness states that the perpetrator
is not present (also known as a correct rejection). The choice of a
foil from a TA lineup is incorrect and is known as a false identi-
fication (or false-positive).
Perpetrator lineups comprised six color photographs on a white
sheet of A4 paper. The photographs, each approximately 8 6 cm
in size, were arranged in a 2  3 array. Each photograph featured
a frontal view head-and-neck shot of either a foil (innocent lineup
member) or the target (the perpetrator depicted in the videos who
is only present in the TP lineup).
Construction of the lineups: Selection of foils. Foils for the
perpetrator lineups were selected on the basis of resemblance to
the target. This method was utilized, as it is the method recom-
mended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE 1984,
Code D: 3.7; The Home Office, 2008) for constructing lineups in
the United Kingdom.
Pools of 184 neutral head-and-shoulder photographs of young
males (early to mid-20s) originally employed by Meissner,
Brigham, and Butz (2005) were used for the selection of perpe-
trator foils. A smaller pool of potential foils was selected by the
experimenter on the basis of similar facial characteristics as the
target in the videos (hair color and style, face shape, and facial
features).
Standardization of the lineups. Independent judges rated
how similar each of the potential foils were to the target on a
10-point scale ranging from not at all similar to very similar. The
judges also rated how distinctive each face was (including the
target) on a 10-point scale ranging from not at all distinctive to
very distinctive. The six faces that were rated most similar to the
perpetrator and of a similar level of distinctiveness to the perpe-
trator by the independent raters were selected as foils for the
lineups.
All similarity ratings for selected perpetrator foils were between
M 4.83, SD 1.83, and M 7.00, SD 0.89 (scale of 0 to 10),
which suggests that no foil was perceived as extremely similar or
dissimilar to the target. Two-tailed paired samples t tests were used
to explore the differences between similarity ratings for the chosen
foils and the perpetrator. Comparisons of all chosen foil and
perpetrator combinations (i.e., Pair 1 with Pair 2, Pair 1 with Pair
3, and so on) revealed no significant differences (all ps  .1),
suggesting that all chosen foils were perceived as equally similar
to the perpetrator, thus minimizing lineup bias. All distinctiveness
ratings for the chosen foils and the perpetrator were between M 
3.20, SD  1.79, and M  4.40, SD  1.94, which suggests that
neither the foils nor the target were perceived as very distinctive or
not at all distinctive. Two-tailed paired samples t tests were used
to explore the differences between the distinctiveness ratings for
the chosen foils and the perpetrator. Comparisons of all foil and
perpetrator combinations (i.e., Foil 1 and target, Foil 1 and Foil 2,
Foil 2 and target, Foil 2 and Foil 3, and so on) revealed no
significant differences (all ps  .09), suggesting that the foils and
the perpetrator were perceived as being of an equal level of
distinctiveness, thus once again minimizing lineup bias.
Counterbalancing/position effects. In line with recommen-
dations by McQuiston-Surrett, Malpass, and Tredoux (2006), two
versions of the TP lineups were created, one with the target in
Position 2 and one with the target in Position 5. This counterbal-
ancing procedure aims to control for position effects and counter-
acts the possibility that participants may communicate to each
other about which position the target is in (see McQuiston-Surrett
et al., 2006).
Procedure. The procedure employed is highly similar to the
procedure in Experiment 1, with the addition of photographic
lineups that occurred at the end of the experimental session. On
completion of the booklet that contained the recall protocol, all
6 HOUSTON, CLIFFORD, PHILLIPS, AND MEMON
participants were administered with a TP or TA perpetrator lineup
and a lineup response sheet. After marking their identification
decision, all participants were debriefed and told the true nature of
the experiment and allowed time to ask any questions. Participants
were then thanked before leaving the laboratory.
Data coding and analysis of the recall and recognition
tasks. Intercoder agreement for the completeness and accuracy
of the recall task was calculated between the experimenter
(K.A.H.) and a second coder blind to the experimental manipula-
tions and research questions, who was not the same person who
was the blind coder in Experiment 1. The blind coder was provided
with a copy of the video transcripts to facilitate coding of accuracy.
Agreement was based on a random sample (20%) of participant
booklets. Intercoder agreement across all categories of detail in the
recall was high (all rs  .7), with all disagreements resolved
through discussion
The recognition data are categorical and so were analyzed with
the chi-square test. Completeness and accuracy of recall data were
analyzed with mixed design ANOVA, followed-up by planned
comparisons of the completeness and accuracy of emotional and
neutral participants’ perpetrator descriptions (thus, /1  .05).
Post hoc t tests with Bonferroni correction were also conducted on
the completeness and accuracy of emotional and neutral partici-
pants descriptions of the remaining detail categories (/3  .016).
Effect sizes used are partial eta-squared and Cohen’s d for
ANOVA and t tests, respectively, and Cramér’s ø’ (range 0 to 1)
for the chi-square (Cohen, 2009).
Results
Manipulation check. An independent samples t test on the
ratings from the postevent emotion rating scale showed that par-
ticipants who viewed the emotion-inducing video rated their ex-
perience of negative emotions as significantly higher (M  1.28,
SD  0.73) than participants who viewed the neutral video (M 
0.20, SD  0.25), t(114)  10.64, p  .001, d  1.98, 95% CI
[0.88, 1.28]. Furthermore, all participants who viewed the neutral
video had a mean rating below 1 for all possible emotion ratings
(including positive emotions) on the postevent emotion rating
scale (M 0.50, SD 0.30), thus suggesting that participants who
viewed the neutral video did not experience any of the listed
emotions during their viewing of the video.
These data confirm that (a) the emotion manipulation was
successful in inducing negative emotion in those who viewed the
emotion-inducing video, and (b) participants who viewed the neu-
tral video remained neutral. Therefore, participants who viewed
the emotion-inducing video will hereafter be referred to as emo-
tional participants, and those who viewed the neutral video will be
referred to as neutral participants.
Breakdown of emotion ratings for those viewing the
crime. The experience of emotion by participants who viewed
the emotion-inducing video was further analyzed in terms of the
individual emotions experienced by participants. The highest emo-
tion rating was for sympathy (M  2.34, SD  0.08), followed by
disgust (M  1.69, SD  1.05), annoyance (M  1.54, SD 
1.01), anger (M  1.53, SD  1.07), irritation (M  1.42,
SD  1.02), sadness (M  1.32, SD  1.02), outrage (M  1.19,
SD  0.97), and upset (M  1.10, SD  0.98). The remaining
ratings of experiencing nothing (M  0.46, SD  0.79), and
emotions of fright (M  0.36, SD  0.61), anxiety (M  0.34,
SD  0.58), happiness (M  0.12, SD  0.05), and relief (M 
0.10, SD  0.35) were all below 1 on the scale.
Recognition data. As no significant differences were found
between the performance of participants on either position-of-
target versions of the TP lineup (p  .2), for the purposes of
analysis, the results were collapsed into one category of TP lineup.
Table 3 shows the frequency of lineup response across lineup type
for emotional and neutral participants.
As it could be argued that a correct response to a TP lineup
(choosing the target) and a correct response to a TA lineup (re-
jecting the lineup) are psychologically different decisions or re-
sponses, separate chi-squares were run on TP and TA lineups, with
their responses coded as Hit, False-Positive, Miss (TP) and False-
Positive, Correct Rejection (TA), respectively.
Target present. A 2 (emotional vs. neutral)  3 (hit, false-
positive, miss) chi-square was run to test the association of the
experience of emotion and lineup response. There was a significant
association between performance on the lineup and the experience
of emotion 2(2) 6.60, p .037, Cramér’s ø’ 0.24. Emotional
participants were more likely to incorrectly identify an innocent
foil (false-positive, 47.5% of the time) than to correctly identify
the perpetrator of the crime (a hit, 27.1% of the time), or to claim
that the perpetrator was not present in the lineup (a miss, 25.4% of
the time). Neutral participants were more likely to correctly iden-
tify the perpetrator of the crime (40.4% of the time) than any other
response option (false-positive, 24.6%; miss, 35.1% of the time).
Therefore, neutral participants were more likely to correctly iden-
tify the perpetrator from a TP lineup than emotional participants
(hit, 40.4% vs. 27.1%), whereas emotional participants were more
likely to incorrectly identify an innocent foil from a TP lineup than
neutral participants were (false-positive, 47.5% vs. 24.6%, respec-
tively).
Target absent. An additional 2 (emotional vs. neutral)  2
(false-positive, correct rejection) chi-square was run on the TA
lineup data to investigate whether the experience of emotion had
an effect on the response of participants to a TA lineup. The
chi-square showed that there was no association between the
experience of emotion and lineup decision, 2(1) 0.72, p .393,
Cramér’s ø’  0.08.
Recall. Completeness and accuracy mean proportions, stan-
dard deviations, and confidence intervals for emotional and neutral
participants across all categories of details are shown in Table 4.
Table 3









TA Lineup n  59 n  58
False-positive 42 37
Correct rejection 17 21
Note. TA  target absent; TP  target present.
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Completeness of recall. A 2 (emotional vs. neutral)  4
(environmental, critical incident, victim, perpetrator) mixed design
ANOVA was run on the completeness data from the free recall. In
line with Experiment 1, a significant main effect of emotion was
found, with neutral participants providing more complete descrip-
tions than emotional participants, F(1, 108)  35.62, p  .001,
partial 2  0.25. A significant main effect of category of detail,
F(3, 324)  314.99, p  .001, partial 2  0.74, was also found,
with the critical incident described more completely than all
other detail categories (all ps  .001), and with environmental
descriptions more complete than victim (p  .001) or perpe-
trator descriptions (p  .001). Completeness of victim and
perpetrator descriptions did not differ significantly from each
other (p  .966). Critically, a significant interaction between
the experience of emotion and the category of detail was found,
F(3, 324)  93.55, p  .001, partial 2  0.46.
Planned comparisons revealed that emotional participants pro-
vided a more complete description of the perpetrator than their
neutral counterparts, t(109)  2.19, p  .015 (one-tailed), d 
0.35. Post hoc t tests also revealed that neutral participants pro-
vided a more complete description of the critical incident than
emotional participants, t(108)  13.65, p  .001, d  2.55.
However, emotional and neutral participants provided similarly
complete descriptions of environmental, t(109)  1.33, p  .187,
d  0.28, and victim, t(109)  0.41, p  .683, d  0.11, details.
Accuracy of recall. A 2 (angry vs. neutral)  4 (environmen-
tal, critical incident, victim, perpetrator) mixed design ANOVA
was run on the accuracy data from the free recall. The main effect
of emotion was nonsignificant, F(1, 113)  1.07, p  .303, partial
2 .01. A significant main effect of category of detail was found,
F(3, 339)  3.61, p  .014, partial 2  .031, with the critical
incident recalled more accurately than the victim details (p 
.006). All other detail categories were not significantly different
from one another (all ps  .149). The interaction between emotion
and category of detail was nonsignificant (F  1). Planned com-
parisons revealed that emotional and neutral participants were
equally accurate when describing the perpetrator, t(113)  0.25,
p  .803, d  0.06, and post hoc t tests revealed that emotional
and neutral participants were equally accurate when describing all
remaining categories of detail (environmental, t[113]  0.58, p 
.563, d 0.07; critical incident, t[113] 1.08, p .280, d 0.21;
victim, t[113]  0.86, p  .390, d  0.13).
Discussion
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate whether
the experience of negative emotion may offset the difficulty that
has been demonstrated in previous investigations of eyewitness
identification (e.g., Meissner et al., 2007). First, the recall and
emotion data replicated from Experiment 1, with participants ex-
periencing a similar reaction to the emotion-inducing and neutral
scenarios, both in terms of the intensity and composition of their
emotional response. Furthermore, emotional participants reported
a more complete description of the perpetrator and a less-complete
description of his actions than their neutral counterparts. This
again suggests that emotional participants focused their attention
on what the perpetrator looked like rather than what he did, and
therefore this may prove advantageous when asked to identify the
perpetrator.
However, the results from the TP photographic lineup show that
emotional participants were less accurate than their neutral coun-
terparts when attempting to identify the perpetrator from the vid-
eos. These findings support the extant literature on stress and
eyewitness identification performance (that stress greatly impairs
an eyewitness’s ability to recognize the perpetrator), extending
them to encompass other experiences of negative emotion accom-
panying different types of eyewitness events. Interestingly, these
results suggest that the experience of negative emotion can have
different effects on memory for the same individual—depending
on whether one is measuring recall or recognition performance.
Emotion was not found to affect performance of participants on the
TA lineup. A lineup task is very difficult and this difficulty is
further exacerbated if the perpetrator is not present, as is the case
for a target-absent lineup. For this reason, target-absent lineups
usually produce very high rates of false-positive responses
(Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001), and this was also the
case in the current study.
General Discussion
In both Experiments 1 and 2, emotional participants provided a
more complete description of the perpetrator than neutral partici-
pants. The data also show that emotion had no effect on the
accuracy of perpetrator descriptions, with emotional and neutral
participants being equally accurate in their perpetrator descrip-
tions. Thus, the hypothesis that negative emotion would result in a
more complete and accurate description of the perpetrator was
Table 4
Mean Proportion Recall of Emotional and Neutral Participants in Terms of Completeness and Accuracy Across All Detail Categories
Detail category
Completeness Accuracy
Emotional Neutral Emotional Neutral
M, SD 95% CI M, SD 95% CI M, SD 95% CI M, SD 95% CI
Environmental 0.29, 0.15 [0.25, 0.33] 0.25, 0.14 [0.21, 0.29] 0.91, 0.13 [0.87, 0.94] 0.92, 0.12 [0.89, 0.95]
Critical incident 0.35, 0.12 [0.31, 0.39] 0.74, 0.18 [0.70, 0.78] 0.93, 0.11 [0.90, 0.95] 0.95, 0.08 [0.92, 0.97]
Victim 0.14, 0.09 [0.12, 0.16] 0.15, 0.17 [0.12, 0.17] 0.87, 0.18 [0.83, 0.91] 0.89, 0.12 [0.85, 0.93]
Perpetrator 0.15, 0.10 [0.13, 0.17] 0.11, 0.07 [0.09, 0.14] 0.90, 0.14 [0.86, 0.94] 0.89, 0.07 [0.85, 0.94]
Note. Scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 denoting no recall and 1 denoting 100% recall. Asterisks denote significant differences between emotional and
neutral participants.
 p  .05.  p  .001.
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only supported for the completeness of recall. Furthermore, in-
creased completeness of perpetrator descriptions by emotional
participants did not translate into improved recognition of the
perpetrator in a photographic lineup. Indeed, negative emotion
impaired recognition.
How can this partial support for our main hypothesis be ex-
plained? The literature on the central and peripheral effect argues
that an emotional stimulus will result in the narrowing of attention
onto central information to the detriment of peripheral information
(Easterbrook, 1959). However, the current findings do not support
a straightforward classification of the effects of negative emotion
in terms of central versus peripheral detail recall (e.g., Reisberg &
Heuer, 2007). Although the emotional participants provided a
more complete description of the perpetrator (which could be
classified as a central detail), they also remembered less about the
critical incident, that is, what the perpetrator actually did (which
could also be classified as central). Further, there were no effects
of emotion on descriptions of the victim in either experiment. For
the information tested here that was most likely to fit into a
classification of “peripheral” (environmental details), the results
did not support the literature that emotion would impair recall for
this type of information. Indeed, emotion improved accuracy of
environmental detail recall in Experiment 1, though this result did
not replicate in Experiment 2 and therefore should be treated with
caution, as it may not be a reliable effect. On the other hand, the
data also do not support a holistic enhancement or impairment of
memory when encoded under negatively emotional conditions (see
Edelstein et al., 2004).
Previous work by Laney and colleagues (e.g., Laney, Campbell,
Heuer, & Reisberg, 2004) found that a central and peripheral effect
was not observed when emotions were thematically induced (in-
duced via a series of unfolding events rather than through still
images). This finding led Laney et al. (2004) to argue that a central
and peripheral effect may be a phenomenon of a so-called pictorial
emotional experience and may not translate to the way real events
are encoded and retrieved. The current results appear to provide
partial support for Laney et al.’s (2004) argument, as the effects of
emotion on the current memory tasks cannot by fully explained by
the central and peripheral effect.
Thus, if the central and peripheral effect cannot fully explain the
current findings, then how do we explain them? Negative emotions
evoked by witnessing a crime may result in a motivation during
recall to describe the perpetrator, hereafter referred to as the
retrieval motivation hypothesis. This is supported by the work of
Koriat and Goldsmith (Goldsmith & Koriat, 1999; Koriat & Gold-
smith, 1996). They argue that free recall is an example of inter-
nally directed retrieval, whereby participants retrieve information
they deem pertinent to successful completion of the task at hand.
When self-motivating which details should be retrieved under the
current paradigm, emotional participants may prioritize the re-
trieval of perpetrator details more than neutral participants.
A question that remains is whether there is a focus on the
perpetrator during encoding as well as retrieval. One possible
explanation is that the emotional participants focused their atten-
tion on the descriptive details of the perpetrator during encoding
and therefore simply did not encode the actions of the perpetrator
in any depth (e.g., Brown & Craik, 2005). Another explanation is
that a focus on the descriptive details of the perpetrator during
retrieval may result in the suppression of the action details of the
event—in order to free-up more retrieval resources for the descrip-
tive information (see MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; MacLeod &
Saunders, 2008). As neither of these possible explanations can be
investigated by the current paradigm, it is recommended that future
studies investigate the encoding and retrieval mechanisms of these
effects, possibly by dividing attention during encoding.
The recognition data from Experiment 2 appear to support the
extant literature (Morgan et al., 2004; Valentine & Mesout, 2009),
as emotional participants are less able than their neutral counter-
parts to accurately identify the individual whose actions provoked
their emotional response. What is interesting about the present data
is the apparent dissociation in recall and recognition performance
for the same individual by emotional participants: Emotional par-
ticipants are better than their neutral counterparts at describing the
perpetrator but worse at recognizing him. Taken together, the
recall and recognition findings suggest that enhanced verbal recall
performance of emotional participants when describing the perpe-
trator is not predictive of an enhanced ability to recognize the
perpetrator. This finding ties in with a recent review of the eye-
witness description and identification literature, which suggests
that a complete and accurate description of an individual may not
translate to accurate recognition of that same individual (Meissner
et al., 2007).
The breakdown of the emotional experience of participants
provides support for the argument that an emotional experience is
a highly complex one, and this may have implications for the
sometimes contradictory findings in the emotion–memory litera-
ture (Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). It is
possible, for instance, that participants who are all branded as
experiencing “negative emotion” in fact experience a different
medley of emotions and these, in turn, have differing conse-
quences for their cognitive performance.
One limitation of the current study is the reliance on self-report
measures of emotional experience. One could argue that the use of
physiological measures, such as heart rate and/or skin conduc-
tance, would have been an objective way to support or validate the
self-report measures. However, physiological measures cannot be
used to differentiate the experience of one emotion from the
experience of other emotions. Physiological measures are only
able to provide data on whether a participant’s heart rate increased
or decreased, whether their sweating levels rose or declined, or
whether muscle tone increased or decreased during the emotional-
inducing video, depending upon whether an activation mode or an
arousal mode of attention control was induced (Deffenbacher et
al., 2004).
One final concern could be that the critical incident differed
between emotional and neutral videos. Therefore, some of the
memory differences reported might be due to one video being
more interesting or attention grabbing than the other. However, a
postviewing question predicated upon the possibility that the two
videos may differ in interestingness by virtue of simply being
different revealed no differences on this dimension between the
two groups, 2(9)  10.96, p  .278, Cramér’s ø’  .35.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects
of emotion on remembering specific details about events and
people within an eyewitness paradigm. Therefore, this paradigm
lends a new methodology to the investigation of the effects of
emotion on specific components of memory performance to a
literature that has previously investigated the effects of emotion on
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the overall completeness and accuracy of the entire memory report.
Under this paradigm, we can detect the subtle effects of emotion
on memory retrieval in a finer-grained detail than has previously
occurred and thus may be able to bring about some cohesiveness
to the literature on the effects of emotion on memory performance
in an eyewitness context.
It would be useful in future research to further delineate the
effects of specific emotions such as anger, fear, sadness, or joy on
retrieval of different types of information. It is anticipated that
such studies would exhibit subtle and focused effects, as are
predicted by the theoretical literature on this subject (e.g., Levine
& Edelstein, 2009; Levine & Pizarro, 2004). What research of this
nature can do is focus on a specific aspect of human experience
and uncover subtle differences in motivation, cognitive processing,
and reporting as a function of emotion, which can have implica-
tions for the criminal justice system.
It would also be interesting for future researchers to investigate
whether the effects of emotion on memory performance observed
herein may change under certain conditions. For example, although
exploratory analysis revealed no sex differences in our data, an
interesting question remains concerning whether the sex of the par-
ticipant may play a role in the effects of negative emotion on memory
performance? Early work on possible differences in the emotional
experience of men and women to negative videos in the media
suggests that differences may exist in the intensity of the emotional
experience for males and females (e.g., Furnham & Gunter, 1985).
However, how gender differences in emotional experience may trans-
late to effects on memory performance within the forensic scenario is
still a matter of debate.
In a related vein, a further question that arises from the literature
and the present studies is whether the effects of emotion on
memory performance would alter if one were to increase or de-
crease the intensity of the emotion experienced? Our analyses
indicated a threshold effect rather than a linear effect, given that
the level of recall did not increase with an increase in emotional
intensity within the emotional group, but the emotional group did
differ from the nonemotional (control) group. However, if partic-
ipants were exposed to a highly emotive scenario, would their
description of the perpetrator become even more complete in
comparison with neutral participants’ descriptions? Would the
highly emotional participants’ descriptions of what the perpetrator
did become even vaguer? Alternatively, would the effects of
emotion on memory performance stay the same regardless of the
intensity of the emotional experience? These are all questions still
under debate in the literature (for a review of these questions, see
Levine & Edelstein, 2009; Levine & Pizarro, 2004). In short,
further research is required on both the effects of different levels of
emotion experienced following the viewing of an emotional scene,
and the effects of viewing differently emotive stimuli, on memory
performance.
In conclusion, the current research indicates that the emotions
elicited when witnessing a crime may have contrasting effects on
different aspects of eyewitness testimony. While the emotional wit-
nesses recalled more information describing a protagonist, they were
less likely to recognize him in a subsequent lineup. The emotional
witnesses also recalled fewer details about the crime itself. Emotions
associated with witnessing a crime are likely to impair memory for the
incident and recognition of the perpetrator. These findings could have
implications for how statements from emotional eyewitnesses are
interpreted and the weight that is given to specific aspects of a
witness’s evidence, depending on their emotional state.
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